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Just Membership
in a Global Community
Seyla Benhabib

A

t the dawn of a new century the transnational movement of peoples has emerged as a major political issue of our times. Whether initiated by economic migrants from the poorer regions of the world trying
to reach the shores of resource-rich democracies in the North and the
West, or undertaken by asylum and refuge seekers escaping persecution, civil wars, and natural disasters, or caused by “displaced persons” fleeing ethnic conflict and state-inflicted violence in their own
societies, such movements have presented the worldwide state system
with unprecedented challenges.
Here are some numbers. It is estimated that whereas in 1910 roughly
33 million individuals lived as migrants in countries other than their
own, by the year 2000 that number had reached 175 million. Strikingly,
more than half of the increase of migrants from 1910 to 2000 occurred
in the last three decades of the twentieth century, between 1965 and
2000. In this period, 75 million people undertook cross-border movements to settle in countries other than that of their origin.1
While migratory movements in the latter half of the twentieth
century accelerated, the plight of refugees has also grown. There are
almost 20 million refugees, asylum seekers, and “internally displaced
persons” in the world. The resource-rich countries of Europe and the
Northern Hemisphere face growing numbers of migrants, but it is
mostly nations in the Southern Hemisphere, such as Chad, Pakistan,
and Ingushetia, that are home to hundreds of thousands of refugees
fleeing wars in the neighboring countries of the Central African Republic, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.
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Since September 11, 2001, the discourse on immigration has also
been increasingly criminalized. Non-members seeking entrance into
countries other than their own, for any of the above-named reasons, are
increasingly considered as “threats” and potential “criminals.” This is
most strikingly reflected in the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Service of one of the oldest immigrant countries of the world,
namely the U.S.A., has now become incorporated into the Department
of (so-called) Homeland Security.
Given the salience of these developments, it is surprising that the
cross-border movements of peoples, and the philosophical as well as
policy problems suggested by them, have been the object of such scant
attention in contemporary political thought.2 In my recent book, The
Rights of Others,3 I intended to fill this lacuna by focusing on political membership. By this term I meant the “principles and practices for
incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities.” The principal category
through which membership has been regulated in the modern world,
namely national citizenship, has been disaggregated or unbundled into
diverse elements, and state sovereignty has been frayed. Consequently,
“We are like travelers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of
old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs.
While the terrain we are traveling on, the world society of states, has
changed, our normative map has not.”4
From a philosophical point of view, transnational migrations bring
to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies
between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and
adherence to universal human rights principles, on the other. There is
not only a tension but often an outright contradiction between human
rights declarations and the sovereign claims of states to control their
borders as well as to monitor the “quality” and quantity of those admitted. There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas posed by these dual
commitments. As the institution of citizenship is disaggregated and
state sovereignty comes under increasing stress, sub-national as well
as supra-national spaces for democratic attachments and agency are
emerging in the contemporary world, and they need to be advanced
with, rather than in lieu of, existing polities.
In this essay, I begin by exploring the origins of the institution of citizenship, then consider the “disaggregation” of citizenship within the
European Union and in some other countries of the world, and finally
I return to recent developments within the United States concerning
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immigration and conclude with philosophical reflections upon “just
membership.”
I. Citizenship in Western Political Thought
The concept of citizenship is one of the cornerstones of Western political thought. In Greek thought the terms polis, politeia, politike, and politikon are all derived from the same root. Their Latin cognate is civitas,
from which is derived “citoyenne” in French and “citizen” in English.
In German, we encounter the term burgh, meaning fortress or town,
and the derivation of burgher, as in Staatsburger,5 the German term for
citizen. In Turkish the word for citizen, Vatandas, derives from the term
Vatan (which may be Arabic in origin) and which means “homeland.”
This brief etymology serves to remind us that citizenship means first
and foremost membership in a bounded community. What such membership entails is itself dependent upon the nature of the political community. As Aristotle noted, a citizen in a democracy is not the same as
a citizen in an aristocracy: in a democracy all can vote, without qualifications of descent and property, while in an aristocracy only some can.6
Throughout the history of the West, citizenship has excluded certain
groups of individuals, whether they be women, non-propertied and
laboring males, or non-Christian and non-white peoples. These human
beings have been barred from citizenship on the grounds that they did
not possess the necessary attributes for citizenship, which were often
understood in conventional terms such as lack of property or income.
More often, though, they were regarded in much more essentializing
terms as lacking the requisite capacities of intellect and emotion.7
With the advent of political modernity through the American and
French Revolutions, citizenship was extended to ever larger numbers
of human beings. It was also enriched through the growth of rights
and entitlements that accrued to this status.8
Modern citizenship still means membership in a bounded political community, which can be a nation-state, a multinational state, or a
commonwealth structure. The political regime of territorially bounded
sovereignty, exercised through formal-rational administrative procedures and dependent upon the democratic will of a more or less culturally homogeneous group of people, can only function by defining,
circumscribing, and controlling citizenship. Ideal-typically, the citizen
is the individual who has membership rights to reside within a territory, who is subject to the state’s administrative jurisdiction, and who
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is also, at least in principle, a member of the democratic sovereignty in
whose name laws are issued and administration is exercised. Following Max Weber, we may say that this unity of residency, administrative
subjection, political participation, and cultural membership constitutes the
“ideal typical” model of citizenship in the modern nation-state of the
West.9 The influence of this model, whether or not it adequately corresponds to local conditions, extends far beyond the West. Modernizing
nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, which entered the process
of state formation at later points than their West European counterparts, copied this structure when they came into existence as well.
What is the status of citizenship today, in a world of increasingly
deterritorialized politics? How is citizenship being reconfigured under
contemporary conditions? How have globalization and the weakening
of the functions of the state in controlling and protecting its economy,
culture, and boundaries against the forces of globalization affected the
theory and practice of citizenship? How has globalization contributed
to the reconfiguration of multiculturalism? Which are the most salient
conflicts around cultural identities in today’s world?
II. Globalization and New Forms of Political Conflict
Recalling Vaclav Havel’s words may give us some insights into these
questions. In a graduation address to Harvard undergraduates more
than a decade ago, Havel said, “This civilization is immensely fresh,
young, new and fragile… . In essence, this new, single epidermis of
world civilization merely covers or conceals the immense variety of
cultures, of peoples, of religious worlds, of historical traditions and
historically formed attitudes, all of which in a sense lie ‘beneath’ it.”
The spread of globalization is accompanied by new forms of resistance
and struggle, along with demands for “the right to worship…ancient
Gods and obey ancient divine injunctions.” The new global civilization
has to understand itself “as a multicultural and multipolar one.”10
As Havel notes, our contemporary condition is marked by the emergence of new forms of identity politics around the globe. Such identity
politics, driven by the attachments of nationality, ethnicity, religion,
gender, “race,” and language, are particularly widespread in the following domains: (1) At the thresholds and borders of new nationstates, which have emerged out of the disintegration of communist
regimes in the territories of the older Soviet Union and Eastern and
Central Europe; (2) In Africa, where the nation-state, a fragile insti-
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tution with roots barely half a century old, is crumbling in Rwanda,
Uganda, the Congo, and the Ivory Coast; (3) In the Middle East, where
as a result of the Gulf and Iraq Wars and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nation-state boundaries, which were haphazardly drawn
by the occupying powers at the end of the First World War after the
fall of the Ottoman Empire, seem more problematic than ever; (4) In
failed states such as Afghanistan, where prior to U.S. intervention, an
armed group such as the Taliban could take state power, while leaving
some areas of the country to the authority of warlords; (5) Compared
to these kinds of identity politics which emerged through institutional
failures affecting states’ capacities, the most prevalent form of identity
politics in Western democracies since the late 1960s has been struggles
for multicultural inclusion, and in some cases, for the multicultural
diversification of citizenship concepts.
The worldwide women’s and Gay and Lesbian movements, the
Quebecois aspirations in Canada, the Basque separatist movement in
Spain, and the ethnic pride movements in the U.S.A. are some of the
best known “struggles for recognition,” to use Charles Taylor’s famous
term.11 Reflecting a social dynamic that we have hardly begun to comprehend, globalization has thus proceeded alongside socio-cultural
disintegration, the resurgence of various separatisms, and international terrorism.
The impact of these developments upon the institution of citizenship has been “the disaggregation of citizenship.” Ideally, citizenship
had bundled together residency, administrative subjection, democratic participation, and cultural membership. What we are seeing today is that
the unity of residency, administrative subjection, cultural identity, and
democratic participation—in short, the modernist and unitary conception of citizenship—is being deeply challenged. Nationality and
residency status are uncoupled, in that increasing numbers of individuals reside in countries where they are not nationals. Furthermore,
residency is accompanied by entitlement to extensive social rights; in
some cases, even political participation rights are granted on the basis
of residency and not citizenship.
These developments have taken place against the background
created by the rise of an international human rights regime. By an
“international human rights regime,” I mean a set of interrelated and
overlapping global and regional regimes that encompass human rights
treaties as well as customary international law or international soft
law.12 Such examples would include the U.N. treaty bodies under the
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention
of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.
The establishment of the European Union (EU) has been accompanied by a Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the formation of a
European Court of Justice. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which also encompasses states that are not EU members, permits the claims of citizens
of adhering states to be heard by a European Court of Human Rights.
Parallel developments can be seen on the American continent through
the establishment of the Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
While these treaties are binding on signatory states alone, they have
set into motion certain developments within global civil society. In the
words of Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International law today is undergoing profound changes that will make it far more effective than it has
been in the past. By definition international law is a body of rules that
regulates relations among states, not individuals. Yet over the course
of the 21st century, it will increasingly confer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals.”13
Against this general background let me analyze the disaggregation
of citizenship effect more closely.
III. Disaggregation of Citizenship: The Case of the European Union
The view that citizenship is a status that confers entitlements (that is,
benefits as well as obligations) derives from T.H. Marshall.14 Marshall’s
catalogue of civil, political, and social rights is based upon the cumulative logic of struggles for expanding democracy in the 19th and early
part of the 20th centuries. “Civil rights” arise with the birth of the
absolutist state, and in their earliest and most basic form they entail
the rights to the protection of life, liberty, and property; the right to
freedom of conscience; and certain associational rights, like those of
commerce and marriage.
“Political rights” in the narrow sense refer to the rights of self-determination, to hold and run for office, and to establish political and non-
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political associations, including a free press and free institutions of
science and culture.
“Social rights” are last in Marshall’s catalogue. They were achieved
historically through the struggles of workers, women, and other social
movements of the last two centuries. Social rights entail the right to
form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations,
health care rights, unemployment compensation, old age pensions,
childcare, housing, and educational subsidies. These social rights vary
widely across countries and depend on the social class compromises
prevalent in any given welfare-state democracy. Their inclusion in any
internationally agreed upon catalogue of universal human rights—
beyond the mere right to employment and a decent standard of living—is a bone of contention among different countries with varying
economic outlooks.
The disaggregation effect is most advanced in today’s world in the
contemporary European Union, in which the rights of citizens of the 25
member countries are sharply delineated from those of third-country
nationals, within a patchwork of local, national, and supranational
rights regimes. These so-called “third-country nationals” include
about three million Turks, scattered across Germany, the Netherlands,
France, Sweden, Denmark and the U.K.; close to two million members
from the federation of former Yugoslav states living throughout EU
countries; about 820,000 Algerians; 516,000 Moroccans; 200,000 Tunisians, mainly in France; and 689,000 migrants from India, 547,000 from
the West Indies, and 406,000 from Pakistan, mainly in the U.K., some of
whom have Commonwealth citizenship.
According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003,
which was not ratified by member states, and was rejected through
Dutch and French referenda in 2005) and following upon the earlier
Treaty of Maastricht (1992), “Every national of a Member State shall
be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional
to national citizenship and shall not replace it.”15 Nationals of all 25
countries who are members of the European Union (the U.K., France,
Germany, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Cyprus) are also citizens of the European Union. What
does being a citizen of the Union mean? What privileges and responsibilities, what rights and duties does this entitle? Is citizenship in the
Union merely a status category, as was membership in the Roman
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Empire?16 Does membership in the EU amount to more than possessing a passport that allows one to pass through the right doors at border
crossings?17
Clearly, Union membership is intended to be more than that. Not
just a passive status, it is expected to involve an active civic identity.
Citizens of EU states can settle anywhere in the Union, take jobs in
their chosen countries, and vote as well as stand for office in local
elections and in elections for the Parliament of Europe. They have the
right to enjoy consular and diplomatic representation in the territory
of a third country in which the member state whose nationals they are
may not be represented. They have the right to petition the European
Parliament and to apply to the European Ombudsman.18 As European monetary and economic integration progresses, EU members are
debating whether Union citizenship should entail an equivalent package of social rights and benefits, such as unemployment compensation,
health care, and old age pensions, which members of EU states can
enjoy in whichever EU country they take up residency.
The unitary model of citizenship that combined continuous residency in a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative
jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but not
another. One can have political rights, such as local and EU level participation and voting rights, without being a national, as is the case
for EU citizens. More commonly, though, as a “guest worker” one has
social rights and benefits without either sharing in the same collective
identity or having the privileges of political membership. But this latter claim also needs modification. In countries such as the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Sweden, “third-country nationals” are also granted
some political participation and voting rights. In the U.K., Commonwealth members can vote in local elections.
A two-tiered status of foreignness has evolved: on the one hand,
there are third-country national foreign residents of European countries, some of whom were born and raised in these countries and know
no other homeland; on the other hand are those who may be almost
total strangers to the language, customs, and history of their host country but who enjoy special status and privileges in virtue of being a
national of an EU member state.19
The obverse side of membership in the EU is a sharper delineation
of the conditions of those who are nonmembers. The agreements of
Schengen and Dublin were intended to make the practices of granting
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asylum and refugee status more uniform throughout member states.20
Referred to as “legal harmonization” in the early 1990s, these agreements had the paradoxical effect of making such status in the Union
increasingly difficult.21 Although the European Council of Ministers
reiterates its adherence to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees
and Asylum Seekers and its Protocol of 1967, the EU seeks enhanced
cooperation with sender countries in controlling the readmission and
return of their nationals who reach EU territory illegally. Cooperative
efforts with sender lands to enhance border controls, intercept illegal immigrants, and create asylum systems have increased. Since in
many cases individuals seeking asylum and refuge are escaping the
oppressive, illegal, and even murderous regimes of their own countries, enhanced cooperation with these governments can only have
disastrous effects upon their lives. A very serious danger posed by
these developments is the undermining of the individual rights-based
system of the Geneva Convention and of the moral as well as constitutional obligations of individual states toward refugees and asylum
seekers, which were based on their own past histories of collaboration
or resistance to fascism and totalitarianism.22
IV. Citizenship in Non-European Contexts
Can this “disaggregation of citizenship” model be generalized across
regions and countries? Despite being the largest immigrant nation
in the world, the American conception of citizenship has remained
remarkably unitary at the level of granting political rights, by making “naturalization” a precondition for political voice. Unlike in some
countries of the EU, there are no voting rights for legal residents within
the U.S.A. at either the local or the statewide levels. This practice is
usually defended by the argument that since the granting of citizenship to legal migrants is fairly open, transparent, and speedy, it is not
unfair to make the acquisition of citizenship a precondition for political voice.23
This argument, however, does not attend to the facts on the ground.
There are at present an estimated twelve million, in official language,
“illegal migrants” in the U.S. I prefer to call them “undocumented
migrants.” Many of these individuals are active and contributing
members of society. Many serve in the national labor force, working on farms and in hospitals, hotels, and sanitation services. Others
send their children to school and are active on community and school

53

Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2007

9

Macalester Civic Forum, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 11

Civic Forum 2007

boards. These individuals, who service hospitals as nurses or orderlies,
are themselves scared to become sick and dependent on hospital facilities. Not having one’s papers in order in our society is a form of civil
death. The status of an illegal migrant is one denuded of political voice
and the protection of civil laws.
More poignantly, on April 4, 2003, U.S. newspapers reported the
case of Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez, aged 27, who died in a tank
battle outside Umm Qasr in Iraq on March 21, 2003. Corporal Gutierrez was an illegal immigrant from Guatemala, an orphan who had
reached the United States through clandestine means and who joined
the Marines in California. His case is by no means unusual: over a
dozen legal and illegal immigrants, mainly from Mexico and Central
America, who were members of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in
Iraq, have lost their lives since March 2003. It is estimated that about
37,000 immigrants serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, making up about
3% of the population on active duty. Their sad stories compelled both
conservative and liberal lawmakers to hastily pass bills granting these
slain soldiers, and in some cases their spouses and children, posthumous citizenship. Others suggested that immigrants who join the
Armed Forces be granted citizenship immediately, while still others
advocated the reduction of the current waiting period for the granting
of citizenship to those in the military from three to two years.
This is by no means the first time that immigrants have served in
the U.S. army. With the abolition of universal conscription, however,
joining the army has become a venue for upward mobility for large
numbers of low-income legal and illegal migrants. We thus have the
disturbing case of individuals dying for a country that denies them
voting rights if they are legal permanent residents waiting to become
“naturalized”; and if they are illegal migrants, as was the case with
Corporal Guttierez, they do not even have the right to obtain a license
or open a bank account.
The causes of migrant “illegality” can vary from bureaucratic mishaps and mistakes to desperate attempts to escape home countries via
smugglers, known as “coyotes,” because of circumstances there. The
status of illegality should not stamp the other as an alien. Clearly, a
democratic adjustment of the practices of legal incorporation is needed
in order to normalize the status of illegal immigrants.
While illegal migrant status means civil death and political silencing, the lack of a political voice for legal permanent residents means
their effective disenfranchisement. An increasing number of individu-
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als wish to retain dual citizenship or to live in one country on a longterm basis while not abdicating their original nationality. Making the
exercise of democratic voice dependent upon one’s nationality status
alone, as the United States laws do, flies in the face of the complex
interdependence of the lives of peoples across borders and territories.
The immigration bill that failed to pass the Senate in spring 2007
(S. 1348), “A bill to provide for comprehensive immigration reform
and for other purposes,” was a double-edged sword. While it promised amnesty to millions of undocumented workers, the attainment of
which entailed a number of onerous logistical and financial loopholes,
it also changed the meaning of immigration in ways that have not been
noted. President Bush’s proposal for a guest worker program obliges
these individuals to leave the U.S. after their contracts are up, without
the possibility of ever acquiring permanent residency or, eventually,
citizenship status. This bill proposes to make into U.S. law the creation
of a permanent global underclass that services the U.S. economy but
can never have access to the benefits of a democratic voice and U.S.
citizenship. This is a radical reversal of the self-understanding of this
country as a “nation of immigrants,” and this shift in policy reflects the
paranoid politics of the post-9/11 world in which the “foreigner” and
the “immigrant” are not viewed as a potential partners with whom
we must share a moral and political space, but as “threats,” as “enemy
aliens.” (Given the heated race for the 2008 Presidential elections in the
U.S.A., this bill has now been tabled till some indefinite date, and certainly till after the elections.)
While the United States has remained impervious to many calls to
facilitate dual citizenship and is making it increasingly difficult for
guest workers to attain American citizenship, countries like Mexico
and the Dominican Republic permit their large diasporic populations
to retain certain citizenship rights at home, such as voting in local and
national elections, continuing to own property, and, in the cases of
the Dominican Republic and Colombia, even running for and holding
office. Increasing numbers of Israeli citizens also hold dual citizenship,
either with the U.S.A. or with other countries of origin. Throughout
Southeast Asia, India, and Latin America, “flexible citizenship,” which
permits the disaggregation of aspects of citizenship by giving individuals multiple residency, property, and political participation rights,
is emerging as the norm.24
Nevertheless, there is a paradox that affects most of these developments and which is inherent in the logic of modern statehood and
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citizenship. It is captured by Hannah Arendt with the phrase “the right
to have rights.”
V. Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of The Right to Have Rights
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt wrote:
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are
rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to a community into which
one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer
a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation where, unless he
commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he
does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of
people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to
freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they
please, but of the right to opinion… . We become aware of the existence of a
right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged
by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized
community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not
regain these rights because of the new global political situation.25

The first use of the term right in the phrase “the right to have rights”
does not show the same discursive structure as its second use. In the
first mention, the identity of the other(s) to whom the claim to be recognized as a rights-bearing person is addressed remains open and indeterminate.26 Note that for Arendt such recognition is first and foremost
a recognition of “membership,” the recognition that one “belongs” to
some organized human community. One’s status as a rights-bearing
person is contingent upon the recognition of one’s membership. Who
is to give or withhold such recognition? Who are the addressees of
the claim that one “should be acknowledged as a member?” Arendt’s
answer is clear: humanity itself. And yet she adds, “It is not clear that
this is possible.”27 The asymmetry between the first and second uses
of the term right derives from the absence in the first case of a specific juridico-civil community of consociates who stand in a relation
of reciprocal duty to one another. What would this duty be?: the duty
to recognize one as a member, as one who is protected by the legalpolitical authorities and treated as a person entitled to the enjoyment
of rights.
In Arendt’s view, the right to have rights transcends the contingencies of birth, which differentiate and divide us from one another. The
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right to have rights can only be realized in a political community in
which we are not judged by the characteristics that define us at birth,
but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and say and
think. “Our political life,” writes Arendt, “rests on the assumption
that we can produce equality through organization, because man can
act and change and build a common world, together with his equals
and only with his equals…We are not born equal; we become equal as
members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”28
To sharpen the issue, Arendt was just as skeptical about the ideals
of world government as she was about the possibility of nation-state
systems ever to achieve justice and equality for all. World government
would destroy the space for politics by not allowing individuals to
define shared public spaces in common. The nation-state system, on
the other hand, always carries within itself the seeds of exclusionary
injustice at home and aggression abroad.
While Arendt offers us only paradoxes, albeit fruitful ones that
show new paths to thinking, we are by no means at a point where we
have resolved them. But the sharp contrasts which she drew between
human rights and citizens’ rights have been mitigated through the
evolution of cosmopolitan norms and the disaggregation of citizenship. National membership is no longer the sole guarantor of access
to rights and entitlements. Increasingly, the world legal community is
recognizing a human right to membership, which means the obligation
of states to naturalize long-term residents and not to denationalize or
deny citizenship to others.29
Just membership in the new global civil society entails recognizing
the moral claim of refugees and asylum seekers to first admittance; a
regime of porous borders for immigrants; an injunction against denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights; and the vindication of
the right of every human being “to have rights,” that is, to be a legal
person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status
of their political membership. The status of alien ought not to denude
one of fundamental rights. Furthermore, just membership also means
the right to citizenship on the part of the alien who has fulfilled certain
conditions. Permanent alienage is not only incompatible with a liberal
democratic understanding of human community, it is also a violation of fundamental human rights. The right to political membership
must be accommodated by practices that are non-discriminatory in
scope, transparent in formulation and execution, and justiciable when
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violated by states and other state-like organs. The doctrine of state
sovereignty, which has so far shielded naturalization, citizenship, and
denationalization decisions from scrutiny by international as well as
constitutional courts, must be challenged. 
•
Notes
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